In Ridel v Goldberg, 2019 ONCA 636, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a judgment creditor was statute-barred from pursuing a claim for contribution and indemnity against the principal of a judgment debtor company. On April 17, 2013, the appellants received a favourable judgment against a registered investment dealer company for negligence, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty (the “2013 Judgment”), which was upheld on appeal a year later. On October 25, 2016, following the bankruptcy of the company, the judgment creditor received authorization from the trustee-in-bankruptcy pursuant to section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to pursue the claim for contribution and indemnity against the principal of the company, Goldberg.
In University Plumbing v Solstice Two Limited, 2019 ONSC 4276, the Superior Court addressed two questions: (i) whether an email can satisfy the acknowledgement requirement under s. 13(1) of the Limitations Act; and (ii) whether a promise to forbear commencing an action affects discoverability of a claim under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Act. The answer to both questions is yes.
The plaintiff contractor alleged that the defendant project owner owed it money and was in breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act. The plaintiff commenced the action in 2015. The defendant argued that the cause of action accrued on August 30, 2012, the date the invoice was issued and that the action was statute-barred.
In Benuik v Leamington, 2019 ONSC 1830, the court addressed the issue of whether the law permits the postponing or suspending of a limitation period simply because a plaintiff brought its claim in the wrong forum. The answer is “no”.
In Benuik, the plaintiffs brought an action before the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) against the defendant municipality in 2009 based on an expert report suggesting that damage to the plaintiffs’ home was caused by, or was related to, vibrations from heavy traffic. In 2010, the defendant responded to the plaintiffs’ statement of claim, pleading that the plaintiffs were in the wrong forum.
In Sax v Rick Aurora, 2019 ONSC 3573, the Divisional Court considered the application of the Limitations Act, 2002 in the context of a derivative claim brought under section 246 of the Business Corporations Act for continuing breaches under an agreement. The plaintiff worked as a real estate agent for the defendants. He incorporated a numbered company to create a space for builders to sell pre-construction real estate to purchasers. His employer and the numbered company entered into an agreement whereby a portion of every commission earned by his employer operating in the numbered company’s space would be paid to the numbered company.
When it comes to claims brought by family members pursuant to s. 61 of the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c. F.3. (“FLA”), the latest word from an Ontario court indicates that the two year limitation period applies to those claims as separate causes of action. In Malik v. Nikbakht, 2019 ONSC 3118, the defendant appealed a Master’s order that permitted the plaintiff to amend the statement of claim to add a claim pursuant to s. 61 of the FLA after the expiry of the limitation period. Section 61 allows family members of a party injured or killed by the fault or neglect of another to recover pecuniary losses that flow from a family member’s death or injury.
This post originally appeared on Dentons Data blog.
On May 12, 2019, the Alberta Court of Appeal released a decision from a summary dismissal application that should resolve any confusion that may have arisen at the crossroads of that province’s limitations act and its privacy legislation, the Personal Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5 (“PIPA”).
In Alberta, in order to have a cause of action related to a privacy breach claim, claimants must first go before the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta (“AB OIPC”) and obtain a final order against an organization.
In Klassen v Beausoleil, 2019 ONCA 407, the Court of Appeal reiterated the principle that a party cannot circumvent the operation of a limitation period by amending their pleadings to add additional claims after the expiry of the limitation period. The Court affirmed that where the amendment involves adding alternative relief on the same material facts, it is integrally related to the existing claim, and therefore, no prejudice arises.
Rule 26.01 provides that “[O]n motion at any stage of an action the court shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.” The expiry of a limitation period is one form of non-compensable prejudice.